The final death of Columbus Center

Paul McMorrow

November 01, 2011

COLUMBUS CENTER was supposed to remake Boston. The massive real estate development promised to reunite the Back Bay and the South End, and catapult its developer, an affordable housing specialist, into the ranks of Boston’s marquee builders.

Ambition bred Columbus Center, and then it fueled one of the most spectacular real estate failures Boston has seen. The city’s most notorious busted project, the Filene’s pit, is just bad feelings piled on top of bad timing. But Columbus Center is a full-blown Greek tragedy - one that started 14 years ago, and ends this week, with a guilty plea in a federal courthouse.

Arthur Winn, Columbus Center’s former would-be developer, is copping to a pair of federal campaign finance misdemeanors, which total $4,500. One of the shell companies Winn’s firm set up to build Columbus Center is swallowing a $1.5 million fine for its role in improperly funneling more than $150,000 to federal, state, and local politicians.

Long before Arthur Winn was guilty of financing illegal campaign contributions, though, he was guilty of needing huge buckets of money to keep a failing real estate development afloat.

Winn’s company first floated plans for Columbus Center, a development spanning four blocks over the Massachusetts Turnpike, in 1997. The massive project immediately raised the hackles of its neighbors, and years of contentious permitting meetings followed.

Nobody in Boston has managed to build an air rights project since Copley Place in 1984, because it’s far more expensive to build on the air rights over highways than it is to build on land. Columbus Center tried to make back the extra costs of building over a highway and rail corridor by piling extra height on top of its expensive deck and tunnel system. Extra height led to years of protracted negotiations with abutters.

The project Winn’s company settled on - 500 luxury residences, a hotel, shops, and parking - ended up being unacceptable to both sides of the development dispute. During the public review process, the project’s budget more than doubled, eventually topping $800 million. Its 35-story tower enraged neighbors, but Columbus Center wasn’t big enough to support its bloated price tag.

When the project finally entered the market for construction financing, the economy was teetering. Its main financial backer imploded. Rather than just letting the project die a natural death, Winn’s company turned to federal, state, and local officials. That decision took what should have been a garden-variety real estate failure, and put it on the road to the federal courthouse.

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