New Findings on Free Will

June 22, 2011|Josh Rothman, Globe Staff

Neuroscience is a vast field, but in the end the whole enterprise is motivated by a few central questions. One of them is, "Do we have free will?" A new study, published in the journal Neuron, has shed a little more light on that question. It suggests that we might need to rethink what "free will" really means.

Until now, the most important finding about free will has come from the famous " Libet experiment," devised by Benjamin Libet in 1983. Libet sat you in a chair, stuck electrodes on your head, and put a clock and a button in front of you. Whenever you felt like it, you could push the button; your only task was to notice when, according to the clock, you'd decided to push it. Libet found that your neurons started firing well in advance of your conscious decision-making: The surge in activity, or "readiness potential," started forming almost a full second before "W," your experienced moment of decision. W, Libet suggested, wasn't the present-tense sensation of making a decision, but the past-tense sensation of already having made one. This felt, to many observers, like a blow struck against the idea of free will.

Libet's experiment was thought-provoking, but imprecise. The followup study, by Itzhak Fried, Roy Mukamel, and Gabriel Kreiman, leverages new technologies that allow neuroscientists to monitor individual neurons, rather than huge brain regions. It also takes advantage of new clinical situations. Nowadays, super-small electrodes are sometimes inserted deep into the brains of epilepsy patients during pre-surgery diagnostic tests. Fried, Mukamel, and Kreiman asked these patients to perform a version of the Libet experiment.

What did they find? First, they discovered that W, the sensation of 'making a decision,' is correllated with activity in the motor areas of the brain -- not in some specific decision-making area. Second, they found that the W moment involves decreases in brain activity, as well as increases. Writing in Neuron, Patrick Haggard, a neuroscientist, argues that it's now "wrong to think of W as a prior intention, located at the very earliest moment of decision in an extended action chain. Rather, W seems to mark an intention-in-action, quite closely linked to action execution.... [occurring when] the brain transforms a prior plan into a motor act." The decreases in neural activity before W, meanwhile, suggest that the brain is set up to "tonically inhibit unwanted actions": the sensation of making a decision might not be about hatching a new plan, but about green-lighting one of many competing impulses.

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