Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers

Four decades later, Ellsberg again powers a moral drama

February 12, 2010|Ty Burr, Globe Staff

Toward the end of “The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers,’’ you begin to realize just how much four decades of history owe to one man.

If Ellsberg, a Defense Department-contracted policy analyst, hadn’t leaked 47 volumes of top secret CIA documents to the press and Congress in early 1971, the Vietnam War might have continued indefinitely. Broad public sentiment wouldn’t have finally turned against the conflict, and the Nixon administration wouldn’t have adopted a paranoid bunker mentality. The president wouldn’t have formed his dirty-tricks squad of White House “plumbers’’ to stop the leaks, wouldn’t have sent them out to dig up dirt on Ellsberg by burglarizing his psychiatrist’s office. The Watergate break-in wouldn’t have happened. Nixon wouldn’t have resigned.

And so on, and so on - no historic 1971 Supreme Court First Amendment case, no politicizing of the nation’s press for better and worse - and all because one stiff-backed ex-Marine refused to ignore his conscience. “The Most Dangerous Man in America’’ - the epithet comes from Henry Kissinger - is hardly evenhanded: It views Ellsberg as a hero and a genuine patriot and allows him, at a grey and dignified 78, to narrate his own story. But evenhanded is one thing and fair is another, and directors Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith make their case that if you or I had known what Ellsberg did - the secret story of US involvement in Southeast Asia and the cynical misleading of the American public by five presidential administrations - we would have, or should have, done the same.

The movie has been nominated for a 2010 Oscar for best feature documentary, but it plays like a solid suspense thriller when it’s not stooping to cheesy touches: doomy atmospheric music and a pair of embarrassingly crude animated “reenactments’’ are the worst offenders. We learn that Ellsberg was there at the Pentagon when President Lyndon B. Johnson used the Tonkin Gulf non-incident as a pretext for escalation in 1964; that two years working in Vietnam for the State Department opened Ellsberg’s eyes to the unwinnability of the war; that a subsequent stint at the RAND Corporation think tank included contributing to a landmark CIA study of the conflict that frankly exposed machinations and manipulations from President Truman on. Of course we were never supposed to see it: It was an in-house confession.

Advertisement
Advertisement
|
|
|
|