As diplomats frantically attempted in early 2003 to agree on a UN resolution approving a military offensive, Bush’s key aides grew impatient, he said.
Grumbling “included noises about ‘this is a waste of time, what we need is regime change, why are we bothering with this, we must sweep this aside and do what’s going to have to be done anyway - and deal with this with the use of force,’ ’’ Greenstock testified to the inquiry panel looking into the Iraq war.
Several nations had hoped to stall the invasion of Iraq to allow UN weapons inspectors more time to search for evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction - the key justification for the war. No such weapons were ever found.
Yet Bush’s inner circle cared little about what international allies thought and refused to halt plans to invade in March 2003, Greenstock said. He said that even then-Prime Minister Tony Blair was unable to persuade Bush, winning only a brief hiatus of two weeks.
“The momentum for earlier action in the United States was much too strong for us to counter,’’ Greenstock said in a written statement to the inquiry panel, provided alongside his live testimony.
Britain’s inquiry is the most exhaustive study yet into the war and will seek evidence from Blair, military officials, and spy agency chiefs. It will not apportion blame or establish criminal or civil liability, but will offer recommendations by late 2010 on how to prevent mistakes from being repeated.
Greenstock told the five-person inquiry panel that the failure to win UN approval for the war had seriously undermined the legitimacy of the conflict.
He said that in his opinion, the US-led invasion of Iraq was legal - a view rejected by critics who say it violated international law - but was of “questionable legitimacy.’’
“It did not have the democratically observable backing of the great majority of member states, or even perhaps of the majority of people inside the UK,’’ he said.
In London, an antiwar rally in 2003 drew an estimated 2 million demonstrators - the largest street protest in a generation.
Greenstock told the panel he had his own doubts, and had threatened to resign if no international backing was agreed upon. His threat came before a November 2002 resolution that offered Iraq a final opportunity to disarm and demanded access for weapons inspectors.
Efforts to agree on a sterner resolution authorizing military action foundered because the international community believed the United States was “hell bent on the use of force’’ regardless of world opinion, Greenstock said.
“The United States was not proactively supportive of the UK’s efforts and seemed to be preparing for conflict whatever the UK decided to do,’’ Greenstock wrote in his statement.
